As a matter of fact, the group that we have named ‘proximity to power’ i.e. the people who exercise power merely because of being inside the circle of one in power are almost as dangerous to the sitting government as its worst opponents.
They have a sense of entitlement that is based solely on their relationship with the ‘power.’ That gives them a sense of invincibility. And, on day to day basis, they are invincible because of their ability to tinker with the state machinery to their advantage.
Sometimes the ‘power’ is not aware of the full extent of their excesses because they use the mid- and low-ranking officials for their purposes.
Closely related to this is the parasitic relationship that develops between the ‘proximity to power’ group and the mid- and low-ranking officials. The one side acts as ‘roof’ for the other, and the other reciprocates by helping them bend the laws in their favour, or even by letting them use the state power in illegitimate ways.
This erodes the whole system — If the ‘proximity to power’ group can affect the hiring and firing of the officials, it means that the officials thus appointed will not feel answerable to law; they will only be concerned with keeping their ‘roof’ happy. Also, the officials, willingly or unwillingly, will comply with the diktats of the ‘proximity to power’ simply because of the fear of losing their job, or even worse.
The whole system thus turns into a perpetual anger machine — a non-stop monster, feeding anger to the people to the point of bursting.
This anger – and it is absolutely monumental in some places in Central Asia already – could be foundation for the appearance of an ISIS-like phenomenon in the region.
As we argued earlier, the foreigners from whatever country are not likely to from the bulk of the ISIS thing in Central Asia simply because of the logistical difficulties. Moreover, the region is not receptive to foreigners in any big way.
We have not still looked at some crucial questions in the second set of questions: Who would finance and support them [ISIS], what would be their aims and how would they go about achieving them?
These questions can only be answered if we merge them with the third set of questions: 1. If there is no ISIS along the Central Asia borders right now, why are certain quarters intent on creating the fear; 2. Does someone want to use ISIS threat for some other purpose; 3. Is it in someone’s interest that a group posing itself as ISIS appear near or inside Central Asia; 4. What is the motivation; and 5. Who would benefit?
In a nutshell, we are trying to pose and answer just one question: What is the likelihood of some external players meddling with the region under the guise of ISIS?
To be continued . . .