Tariq Saeedi
The Middle Corridor has deservedly become one of the most discussed connectivity initiatives across Eurasia. It is attracting unprecedented political attention, financial commitments, and commercial interest.
Much of this enthusiasm is justified.
The corridor offers diversification of trade routes, strengthens the economic prospects of the countries along its path, and provides greater resilience to global supply chains. These are genuine advantages that stand on their own merit.
At nCa, we have consistently argued in favor of the Middle Corridor because it is an economically sound project with the potential to reshape regional trade and unlock opportunities for Central Asia and the wider Eurasian region.
Yet support for the Middle Corridor should not require the denial of geographical reality.
Increasingly, discussions about Eurasian connectivity are framed through the lens of present-day geopolitics rather than long-term economics. That is understandable. Political circumstances inevitably influence commercial decisions. Governments respond to the realities of their time, and businesses must often adapt accordingly.
The difficulty arises when temporary political circumstances begin to redefine permanent economic thinking.
Politics is inherently fluid.
Governments change. Policies evolve. Alliances shift. International relationships pass through periods of confrontation, accommodation, and reconciliation. History rarely moves in straight lines.
Geography, however, does not negotiate.
Across the Eurasian landmass, two immense geographical spaces—Russia and Iran—remain integral parts of the continent’s physical connectivity. Their railways, highways, ports, logistics centers, pipelines, and industrial infrastructure represent investments accumulated over decades, in many cases over generations.
One may disagree with the policies of the governments currently in power in Moscow or Tehran. Equally, those governments may disagree with the policies of many other countries.
Such differences are real and, in some cases, profound.
But political disagreements do not erase geography.
Nor do they remove infrastructure from the map.
The territories of Russia and Iran are not temporary political constructs. They are enduring geographical realities that will continue to occupy their place within Eurasia regardless of how today’s geopolitical disputes ultimately evolve.
This distinction matters because connectivity is, fundamentally, an economic endeavor.
Its purpose is not to reward friends or punish rivals. Its purpose is to move goods, reduce costs, shorten transit times, improve reliability, and expand choices for producers and consumers alike.
If economic planning becomes excessively shaped by temporary political preferences, there is a risk that today’s expedient decisions become tomorrow’s structural inefficiencies. Infrastructure investments often remain in service for fifty years or more. Rail corridors, ports, logistics hubs, and industrial supply chains cannot be redesigned every time international politics enters a new phase.
The consequences of building permanent economic architecture around temporary political conditions may persist long after those political conditions have changed.
This is not an argument against developing alternative routes. On the contrary, resilience demands diversification. The Middle Corridor strengthens that resilience by providing additional options for trade across Eurasia. Multiple corridors make supply chains more secure, not less.
Diversification, however, should not be confused with substitution.
A healthy continental transport system is unlikely to consist of one dominant route replacing another. Rather, it will resemble an interconnected network in which multiple corridors complement one another according to geography, economics, capacity, and commercial demand.
The Middle Corridor should flourish because it is efficient, competitive, and commercially attractive—not because other geographical realities are temporarily viewed through a political lens.
Eventually, today’s unresolved disputes will find some form of resolution. History offers no shortage of examples where periods of intense confrontation have eventually given way to new arrangements that few had anticipated. The precise outcome cannot be predicted, nor should it be.
What can be predicted with much greater confidence is something far simpler.
When the political landscape eventually changes—as it inevitably will—the geography of Eurasia will remain exactly where it has always been.
Russia will still occupy the northern expanse of the continent.
Iran will still connect Central Asia and the Caspian region to the Persian Gulf and beyond.
Their transport infrastructure will still exist, waiting to be integrated into whatever commercial landscape emerges.
The decisions being made today should therefore be guided not only by present circumstances but also by the enduring realities that will outlast them.
The Middle Corridor deserves sustained investment, thoughtful policy support, and continued international cooperation. It is one of Eurasia’s most promising connectivity projects.
But supporting one corridor should never require pretending that others, or the geography that sustains them, have somehow disappeared.
Economic geography has a much longer memory than politics.
Wise connectivity policy recognizes both. /// nCa, 27 July 2026