Tariq Saeedi
In this part of the series, we will look at the scenarios of TAPI without the participation of India.
TAPI Viability Without India: Comprehensive Justification Analysis
Preamble: Regional Cooperation Preference
We emphasize that Pakistan strongly supports India’s continued participation in TAPI. India’s involvement would:
- Generate $700-800 million annual transit revenue for Pakistan
- Enhance regional cooperation and economic integration
- Reduce per-unit costs through economies of scale
- Promote peace and stability in South Asia
However, prudent strategic planning requires us to evaluate TAPI’s viability even if India opts out or goes at slower pace compared to the other TAPI partners. This analysis demonstrates that TAPI remains economically justified and strategically beneficial for Pakistan under a TAP (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan) scenario. In fact, the overall profitability and versatility of TAPI may enhance in TAP format i.e. without the participation of India.
When considering this, we will start with the fact that with the growing economic stability and expanding industrial sector, Afghanistan is approaching the position to consume larger volumes of natural gas compared to its allocated share under TAPI.
Table 1: Afghanistan’s Industrial Sector Development & Recovery (2023-2025)
| Sector | 2023 Status | 2024 Growth | Key Developments | Gas Potential |
| Overall Economy | GDP growth: 2.3% | GDP growth: 2.7% | Recovery from -6.4% contraction (2022/23) | Stable foundation |
| Cement Industry | 48,000 tonnes/year | 13% YoY growth | Jabal-e Saraj: 26,000 t/yr Ghori: 22,000 t/yr New Iranian imports via rail | High gas demand |
| Fertilizer Production | Balkh province operational | Expanding | Gas-fed urea plants Serves agriculture boom | 350,000-370,000 m³/day |
| Power Generation | Bayat Power operational | 1 billion kWh produced by 2024 | First modern gas plant (Sheberghan) Siemens turbines Serves 100,000s customers | 270,000-250,000 m³/day |
| Steel & Manufacturing | Recovery phase | Transportation eq: +85% Machinery: +63% Chemicals: +37% | Imports of intermediate goods: $1.8B (2023) $1.5B (H1 2024) | Growing demand |
| Construction | Rapid expansion | Urbanization accelerating | Population growth: 2.1% annually Fertility rate: 5.3 births/woman | Energy intensive |
| Textiles | Small-scale production | Modernizing | Afghan traditional exports Regional market potential | Gas for processing |
| Mining (under development) | Copper, lithium, rare earths | Chinese interest announced 2021 | Aynak copper project (MCC) Lithium exploration ongoing | Future industrial base |
Sources: World Bank Afghanistan Development Update (Dec 2024, April 2025), NSIA, Bayat Power, Mining Watch Afghanistan
Table 2: Afghanistan’s Current Natural Gas Production & Infrastructure
This table gives an approximate idea of the production of natural gas in Afghanistan. According to some reports, the actual production could be much less than 23-25 mmcfd shown in this table.
| Gas Field | Current Production | Location | End Use | Status |
| Yatim Taq Field | 500,000-570,000 m³/day | Jowzjan Province | Bayat Power: 270,000 m³/day Balkh fertilizer/power: 350,000+ m³/day | Operational – 5 wells |
| Shakarak Field | 50,000+ m³/day | Northern region | Industrial supply | Operational |
| Jarqadoque Field | 58,000 m³/day | Northern region | Industrial supply | Operational |
| Khwaja Gogerdak Field | 41,000 m³/day | Northern region | Industrial supply | Operational |
| Total Current Production | ~650,000-720,000 m³/day | Northern Afghanistan | ~23-25 MMCFD | Insufficient |
Current Gap: Afghanistan’s current gas production (~23-25 MMCFD) is barely enough for existing fertilizer plant and power generation. Additional gas is desperately needed for expansion. [25 mmcfd is approximately 0.2586 bcm/a.]
TAPI Allocation: Afghanistan’s 500 MMCFD allocation represents 20x current production – a transformational supply increase.
Table 3: Afghanistan Gas Demand Projections (2025-2040)
Afghanistan should actually be able to consume more gas than its assigned share. According to this hypothetical table, it should be possible for Afghanistan to consume about 8.27 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually.
| Sector | Current (2025) | 2030 Projection | 2035 Projection | 2040 Projection | Key Drivers |
| Power Generation | 25 MMCFD | 80-100 MMCFD | 120-150 MMCFD | 150-180 MMCFD | Urban electrification Industrial power Population growth (2.1% annually) |
| Fertilizer (Feed + Fuel) | 40 MMCFD | 80-100 MMCFD | 100-120 MMCFD | 120-140 MMCFD | Agriculture expansion Food security Export potential |
| Cement Industry | 5 MMCFD | 15-20 MMCFD | 25-30 MMCFD | 30-40 MMCFD | Construction boom Urbanization Infrastructure rebuild |
| Steel & Manufacturing | 5 MMCFD | 15-25 MMCFD | 30-40 MMCFD | 40-60 MMCFD | Industrialization Import substitution Chinese investment |
| Residential/Commercial | 10 MMCFD | 25-35 MMCFD | 40-50 MMCFD | 50-65 MMCFD | Urban growth Rising living standards Natural gas network expansion |
| Petrochemical (New) | 0 MMCFD | 20-30 MMCFD | 50-70 MMCFD | 70-100 MMCFD | TAPI-enabled development Joint ventures Value addition |
| CNG/Transport | 5 MMCFD | 15-20 MMCFD | 20-25 MMCFD | 25-30 MMCFD | Vehicle fleet growth Import reduction |
| Mining & Extraction | <1 MMCFD | 10-15 MMCFD | 20-30 MMCFD | 30-40 MMCFD | Copper, lithium projects Heavy industry |
| TOTAL DEMAND | ~90 MMCFD | 260-345 MMCFD | 405-515 MMCFD | 515-655 MMCFD | 5x-7x current by 2040 |
| TAPI Allocation | 500 MMCFD | 500 MMCFD | 500 MMCFD | 500 MMCFD | Adequate supply |
| Surplus Available | 410 MMCFD | 155-240 MMCFD | (-15) to 95 MMCFD | (-155) to (-15) MMCFD | Justifies higher share |
Critical Finding: Afghanistan’s TAPI allocation of 500 MMCFD is appropriate and can be fully utilized by 2035-2040 given the country’s industrial development trajectory.
Justification for Increased Allocation: If India withdraws, Afghanistan could justify taking 700-800 MMCFD (instead of 500 MMCFD), leaving 1,525-1,625 MMCFD for Pakistan – still more than Pakistan’s baseline allocation of 1,325 MMCFD.
As we have seen here, Afghanistan can actually consume considerably more volumes of gas from TAPI.
However, we also need to look at the options available to Pakistan to consume more gas to compensate for the absence of India from TAPI. This is what we will do in the next part of this report. /// nCa, 1 December 2025 (to be continued . . .)