Report: China and Central Asia Railway Connections

nCa-AI Collaborative Report

Key Points

Research indicates there are currently two main operational railway connections between China and Central Asia, both crossing into Kazakhstan, with a third under development; these facilitate the bulk of cargo traffic in the region.
Rail gauges differ, with China using 1435 mm (standard) and Central Asian countries using 1520 mm (broad), leading to necessary transshipments at borders that can add time and cost but are managed efficiently at key points.
Cargo volumes have grown steadily, reaching about 32 million tons total between China and Kazakhstan in 2024, with projections for over 33 million tons in 2025; traffic flows both ways, though exports from Central Asia to China (like minerals and energy) often exceed imports.
These connections primarily serve Kazakhstan directly but extend cargo reach to all five Central Asian nations (Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan) through interconnected rail networks, and further to Russia, Europe, the Caucasus, and parts of the Middle East.
The proposed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, set to begin construction in 2025, appears likely to enhance options by offering a shorter, direct route that could handle 10-12 million tons annually, potentially easing bottlenecks and opening new trade links to South and West Asia, though challenges like funding and security remain.

Current Railway Connections

The primary links are at Alashankou-Dostyk and Khorgos-Altynkol, both on the China-Kazakhstan border. These handle the vast majority of rail cargo between China and Central Asia. A third crossing, Bakhty-Chuguchak, is being developed to increase capacity. No direct rail connections exist yet to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, or Turkmenistan, so cargo to these countries routes through Kazakhstan’s network.

Gauges and Operations

China’s standard gauge (1435 mm) contrasts with the 1520 mm gauge used in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states, inherited from the Soviet era. This requires bogie changes or cargo reloading at border stations, which can take 24-36 hours depending on volume. Facilities at these points are equipped for efficient handling, supporting growing trade.

Cargo Volumes and Directions

In 2024, total rail cargo between China and Kazakhstan hit a record 32 million tons, up 13% from 2023. Dostyk-Alashankou managed around 18 million tons, while Khorgos-Altynkol handled approximately 14 million tons (estimated based on partial data). For 2025, volumes are projected to exceed 33 million tons, with about 21 million tons from Kazakhstan to China (e.g., coal, metals) and 12 million tons the other way (e.g., consumer goods). Growth in the first months of 2025 was around 13-18% year-over-year.

Reach and Served Countries

These borders connect China to Kazakhstan’s extensive rail system, which links to Uzbekistan (south), Turkmenistan (via shared borders and lines), Kyrgyzstan (limited but accessible via Uzbekistan), and Tajikistan (through Uzbekistan). Beyond Central Asia, routes extend north to Russia and Europe (via the Eurasian Land Bridge), or west via the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and even Iran. Over 80% of China-Europe rail freight transits here, serving global supply chains.

The Proposed CKU Railway

This project aims to create a direct link from Kashgar in China through Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan, bypassing some existing routes. It could add significant capacity and efficiency to regional trade, though its full effects depend on successful implementation amid ongoing discussions.

The railway infrastructure between China and Central Asia plays a pivotal role in regional trade, primarily channeled through Kazakhstan due to its shared border and extensive network. As of October 2025, the connections are limited to two key operational border crossings, with efforts underway to expand them. This detailed overview draws from recent reports and analyses to provide a comprehensive picture of the current setup, including technical aspects, traffic data, and broader connectivity. It also examines the anticipated role of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, a major proposed initiative under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Overview of Existing Railway Connections

China shares land borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in Central Asia, but operational rail links exist only with Kazakhstan. This is because Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have rugged mountainous terrain that has historically hindered direct rail development, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan do not border China directly. Consequently, all rail cargo to and from Central Asia funnels through Kazakhstan’s borders, leveraging its position as a transit hub.

The two main crossings are:

Alashankou (China) – Dostyk (Kazakhstan): Established in 1990, this is the older and busier point, connecting China’s Lanzhou-Xinjiang railway to Kazakhstan’s network.
Khorgos (China) – Altynkol (Kazakhstan): Opened in 2012, this serves as a complementary route, often handling containerized freight and integrated with dry ports.

A third crossing, Bakhty (Kazakhstan) – Chuguchak/Tacheng (China), is in development as part of the Bakhty-Ayagoz railway line, expected to boost capacity by diverting traffic and reducing congestion at the existing points. No direct rail exists to other Central Asian states, though proposals like the Five Nations Railway (China-Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan-Afghanistan-Iran) remain in early planning stages and are not operational.

Rail Gauges and Border Operations

A key technical challenge is the difference in rail gauges:

China side: 1435 mm (standard gauge), aligned with international norms for high-speed and efficient operations.
Central Asia side: 1520 mm (broad gauge), a legacy of Soviet-era infrastructure prevalent in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.

This mismatch necessitates gauge breaks at the borders, where trains undergo bogie exchanges (swapping wheel sets) or cargo transshipment (unloading and reloading). At Alashankou-Dostyk and Khorgos-Altynkol, specialized facilities handle this, with transshipment times typically ranging from 24 to 36 hours, influenced by cargo volume, type, and customs procedures. These operations ensure seamless continuation but can introduce delays during peak periods or harsh weather, such as winter freezes or sandstorms in western China.

Cargo Volumes and Traffic Directions

Rail cargo between China and Central Asia has seen robust growth, driven by BRI investments and demand for commodities like minerals, energy products, and manufactured goods. Data focuses on China-Kazakhstan flows, as they represent the gateway for the region.

In 2024, total rail cargo volume between China and Kazakhstan reached a record 32 million tons, a 13% increase from 2023. This included approximately 18 million tons via Dostyk-Alashankou and around 14 million tons via Khorgos-Altynkol, based on station-specific reports (e.g., Dostyk handled 18 million tons, while Altynkol processed 7.7 million tons in the first seven months alone, extrapolating to about 13-14 million annually).

For 2025, projections indicate over 33 million tons total (some sources say up to 35 million tons), with early data showing 11.4 million tons in the first four months (up 13% year-over-year). Traffic is bidirectional but imbalanced: Kazakhstan-to-China flows (about 21 million tons projected for 2025) dominate with exports like coal, iron ore, and grains, while China-to-Kazakhstan (around 12 million tons) includes electronics, machinery, and consumer products.

Overall China-Central Asia freight trains operated 9,626 cross-border runs in the first eight months of 2025, up 22.7%.

Border Point	2024 Volume (Million Tons)	2025 Projection (Million Tons, Partial/Total)	Primary Cargo Types (Back/Forth)	Notes
Alashankou-Dostyk	~18	~11.4 (first 4 months, part of total >33)	To China: Minerals, energy; From China: Manufactured goods	Older point; handled 7,684 trains in 2024.
Khorgos-Altynkol	~14	Included in total >33	Similar, with more containers	Newer; 7.7 million tons in first 7 months of 2024.
Bakhty-Chuguchak (Proposed)	N/A	Expected to add capacity post-2025	TBD	Under development to alleviate congestion.

Reach and Countries Served

The Kazakhstan connections act as a gateway, with cargo distributing via Kazakhstan’s 16,000+ km rail network. Directly, they serve Kazakhstan (e.g., to Almaty, Astana). From there:

To other Central Asian countries: Uzbekistan (via southern lines like to Tashkent), Turkmenistan (border links near Beyneu or via Uzbekistan), Kyrgyzstan (connections via Uzbekistan to Bishkek), Tajikistan (through Uzbekistan to Dushanbe). This enables re-exports of Chinese goods to these landlocked nations.
Beyond Central Asia: North to Russia (e.g., to Moscow, integrating with Trans-Siberian), then Europe (Germany, Poland via Eurasian routes). West via Aktau port on the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Iran (part of the Middle Corridor or TITR, which saw 4.5 million tons in 2024, up 62%). This corridor reduces transit times to 14-18 days for some routes.

Over 80% of China-Europe rail freight transits these points, supporting global trade in sectors like automotive, electronics, and agriculture. Challenges include seasonal disruptions and bottlenecks, but agreements to double cross-border trains in 2025 aim to address this.

Connection Point	Directly Served Countries	Extended Reach (Via Networks/Ports)	Key Trade Routes
Alashankou-Dostyk	Kazakhstan	Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan; Russia, Europe	Eurasian Land Bridge to Europe; Northern Corridor via Russia.
Khorgos-Altynkol	Kazakhstan	Same as above; plus Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Iran via Caspian	Middle Corridor (TITR); Southern extensions to Middle East.

Assessment of the Proposed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway

The CKU railway represents a strategic expansion, first proposed in the 1990s but gaining momentum under BRI. As of 2025, construction is scheduled to start, following agreements in late 2024.

Project Details:

Route and Length: From Kashgar (Xinjiang, China) through Kyrgyzstan’s mountains to Andijan or other points in Uzbekistan; total length 486-523 km.
Cost and Funding: Estimated US$8 billion overall, with Kyrgyzstan’s share at US$4.7 billion; China providing over US$2.35 billion as a loan, raising debt concerns.
Capacity and Timeline: Designed for 10-12 million tons annually; construction begins 2025, but completion could take years due to terrain.
Gauges: Same mismatch (1435 mm vs. 1520 mm), requiring similar border solutions.

Benefits and Additions to Cargo Movement:

Efficiency Gains: Shortens China-Europe routes by 900 km and cuts transit times by 7-8 days compared to via Kazakhstan/Russia, reducing costs by up to a third for some goods (e.g., coal). This could divert traffic from congested points, adding redundancy.
Capacity Boost: Potential to handle 10-12 million tons/year, increasing overall China-Central Asia flows by 30-40% if integrated well. It enables direct access for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, facilitating exports like Kyrgyz farm produce and Uzbek textiles to China, and Chinese imports without Kazakh transit fees.
Broader Reach: Connects to Uzbekistan’s network, opening paths to Turkmenistan, Iran, Turkey, and potentially Afghanistan/Pakistan (via extensions). This reshapes logistics, linking Central Asia to Pacific ports and boosting sectors like mining and agriculture. Bidirectional benefits include faster perishable goods transport and job creation in transit hubs.
Geopolitical Impact: Offers an alternative to Russian-dominated northern routes, enhancing diversification amid sanctions, and positions Kyrgyzstan/Uzbekistan as key nodes.

Overall, the CKU could transform cargo dynamics by providing a southern corridor, complementing the Middle Corridor, and fostering balanced growth across Central Asia and beyond. While it adds to rather than replaces existing links, its success hinges on timely execution and regional cooperation. /// nCa, 9 October 2025

Key Citations