Tariq Saeedi
As I reflect on the events unfolding since the strikes began on 28 February 2026, the conflict with Iran is now entering its third day, a point that feels like the early midpoint in what was anticipated to be a swift operation.
The initial decapitation of Iran’s leadership, including the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has been followed by extensive aerial bombardments targeting military installations, infrastructure, and, regrettably, civilian sites such as schools.
Yet, the results so far diverge sharply from what many on the initiating side appear to have expected. Instead of a collapse leading to widespread relief or celebration within Iran, the response has been one of defiance, with crowds taking to the streets not in jubilation but in calls for revenge.
From my perspective, this misalignment stems from a fundamental miscalculation about the Iranian people’s reaction. Reports from state media and social channels show large gatherings mourning Khamenei and protesting the attacks, with chants echoing demands for retaliation.
While there are isolated accounts of celebrations among some segments—particularly those disillusioned with the regime—the predominant sentiment appears unified around defense and vengeance. This isn’t the fracturing that was perhaps hoped for; rather, it seems to have galvanized a sense of national solidarity against external aggression. — This is the debris of expectations.
President Trump has suggested the campaign could wrap up in as little as five weeks, framing it as a precise effort to neutralize threats. On the Iranian side, however, officials have signaled readiness for a prolonged engagement, though without specifying a timeline. This asymmetry highlights a lack of clear strategy among the attackers, who seemed convinced that removing the top echelon would trigger immediate regime change.
As I noted in my previous piece, regime change from an external viewpoint often conflates the ousting of leaders with a wholesale systemic overhaul. In Iran, the theocratic structure is deeply embedded, and the people, by and large, seek reforms within it rather than its complete dismantling.
Iran, it turns out, was somewhat prepared for such a scenario. In the lead-up to the strikes, Khamenei reportedly issued directives for key figures in government and the military to designate multiple levels of successors—up to four tiers in some cases. This has facilitated a relatively smooth transition to an interim council, comprising the president, judiciary head, and a senior cleric, as per constitutional protocols. The resulting decentralization of authority suits the asymmetric warfare Iran is now pursuing, allowing fragmented command structures to operate independently.
The successor to Khamenei has been nominated and there is the focus on continuity.
Iran’s retaliation has targeted U.S. bases in the region, from Iraq to the Gulf states. This approach carries dual implications. It underscores to host nations the high costs of accommodating American forces—potential damage to infrastructure and economies that could strain alliances.
Conversely, it might draw these countries deeper into the fray, either through direct involvement or indirect support, escalating the conflict beyond its current scope.
For observers like myself, the key takeaway is the apparent alignment between the Iranian populace and its leadership in this moment of crisis, driven by a shared resolve to avenge losses and protect sovereignty.
Conflicts of this nature, reliant on airpower without ground troops, have inherent limitations in duration and effectiveness. Iran’s territory spans about 1.65 million square kilometers—roughly 1.5 times the combined area of Iraq and Afghanistan—much of it rugged and conducive to guerrilla tactics.
Its population, nearing 90 million, is comparable to that of Iraq and Afghanistan together, with a significant portion potentially mobilizable through the Basij, a volunteer paramilitary force under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Numbering in the hundreds of thousands actively, with millions in reserves, the Basij could transform into a widespread resistance network, complicating any prolonged aerial campaign.
Moreover, the decentralized setup means that capitulation in one area wouldn’t signify national surrender; pockets of resistance could persist indefinitely.
In light of this, de-escalation through diplomatic channels and peace negotiations emerges as the most viable path forward, avoiding a quagmire that benefits no one. As the situation evolves, I’ll continue to watch how these dynamics play out, but for now, the debris of unmet expectations litters the landscape of this war. /// nCa, 3 March 2026